APPEALABILITY OF JUDGMENTS ENTERED
PURSUANT TO REVITTITURS IN FEDERAL COURTS
The practice of allowing a trial judge to condition his refusal of a
defendant's motion for a new trial upon the plaintiff's acceptance of a
reduction in damages, known as a remittitur, has had a long, if somewhat uneven, history in the federal court system.' In particular, this
mechanism for imposing the judge's will upon the determination of
damages in a civil trial has been criticized 2 in light of the seventh

amendment's seemingly categorical mandate that
[i]n suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact
tried to a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.8

A remittitur order places the plaintiff in a quandary: if he refuses
to remit part of his verdict and submits to a new trial,4 there is a

possibility that he will receive a lower damage award in the second trial,
and a certainty that he will incur further expenses in the later proceeding; alternatively, he may file the remittitur, giving up that part of his
verdict which the trial judge considers unreasonable, but avoiding the

new trial. Under the traditional rule, a plaintiff who elects the latter
course is foreclosed from bringing any appeal based upon the ensuing
judgment.5 In a line of cases beginning with Delta Engineering Co. v.

Scott0 and continuing most recently through Bonura v. Sea Land Serv1. See Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474,483-84 (1935).
2. Id. at 482-84. See text accompanying notes 57-69 infra.
3. U.S. CONsT. amend. VII. Remittiturs were approved in Arkansas Valley Land &
Cattle Co. v. Mann, 130 U.S. 69 (1889).
4. An order granting a new trial usually is not appealable, since it lacks the finality
required by 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1970). Such an order may be reviewed after a judgment
has been entered at the subsequent trial; however, the complaining litigant must reserve
his appeal until after the second trial. See, e.g., Dillard Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Fidelity
Union Life Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 331 (5th Cir. 1975); cf. Montgomery Ward & Co. v.
Duncan, 311 U.S. 243, 254 (1940). See generally 6A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
59.15[l], at 59-273 to 59-275 (2d ed. 1974); 11 C. WRIGrr & A. MILLER, mERAL
PRACTIcE AND PROCEDURE: CviL § 2818, at 113-17 (1973).
5. See, e.g., Casko v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry., 361 F.2d 748, 751 (7th Cir. 1966);
Movible Offshore Co. v. Ousley, 346 F.2d 870, 875 (5th Cir. 1965); S. Birch & Sons v.
Martin, 244 F.2d 556, 562 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 837 (1957). Movible
Offshore Co. v. Ousley, a decision following the traditional rule where the remittitur is
not protested at the time it is filed, indicates the essential quality of the protest itself.
6. 322 F.2d 11 (5th Cir. 1963).
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ice, Inc.,' the Fifth Circuit has allowed plaintiffs who are put to the
choice of a reduction in damages or the risk and expense of a new trial
to accept the remittitur "under protest," i.e., with reservation of a right
to appeal. These decisions allow a plaintiff to take judgment for the
reduced amount and then to claim on appeal that the trial judge's
remittitur order was erroneous.8 The Sixth Circuit has also allowed a
party to appeal after accepting a remittitur under protest. 9 However,
while the Fifth Circuit has adopted the procedure by judicial choice, the
Sixth Circuit has reasoned that the matter must be governed by state
0
law.'
This Note will examine the legal and practical considerations underlying the decisions of the federal courts on the use of the "under
protest" remittitur. 11 Three basic issues arise from the decisions: first,
whether a federal court must conform its practice as to appeals by
remitting parties to that of the state in which it sits; second, assuming
the absence of such a choice of law rule, whether Supreme Court
precedent 2 forecloses adoption of the under protest remittitur by federal
courts; and, finally, the degree to which adoption of the "under protest"
rule would affect the distribution of the workload between district courts
and courts of appeals.
APPLICATION OF THE "UNDER PROTEST"
QUESTION OF STATE LAW

RULE AS A

The Supreme Court case most directly on point for the question of

whether a state practice which is solicitous of juries' 3 must be applied in
federal courts in the face of a contrary federal practice is Herron v.
Southern Pacific Co.' 4 Herron involved the issue of whether the Rules of

7. 505 F.2d 665 (5th Cir. 1974).
8. Wiggs v. Courshon, 485 F.2d 1281, 1283 (5th Cir. 1973).
9. Mooney v. Henderson Portion Pack Co., 334 F.2d 7 (6th Cir. 1964).
10. Id. at 8-9. The Second Circuit has recorded conflicting precedents. Compare
Burris v. American Chicle Co., 120 F.2d 218, 223 (2d Cir. 1941), with Mattox v. News
Syndicate Co., 176 F.2d 897, 904 (2d Cir. 1949). The Second Circuit discussed the
"under protest" rule in a recent case without deciding whether to apply the rule.
Reinertsen v. George W. Rogers Constr. Corp., No. 564 (2d Cir., July 3, 1975).
11. For a discussion of a related issue in a state-court context, see Note, Civil
Procedure-Remittitur-RemittingParties Right to Cross-Appeal, 49 N.C.L. REv. 141
(1970).
12. Woodworth v. Chesbrough, 244 U.S. 79, 80-81 (1917); Koenigsberger v.
Richmond Silver Mining Co., 158 U.S. 41, 52 (1895). See text accompanying notes 4148 inf ra.
13. See text accompanying note 73 infra.
14. 283 U.S. 91 (1931).
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Decision Act'; mandated the application in a federal court sitting in
Arizona of article 15, section 5 of the Arizona Constitution, which
provided that "[tihe defense of contributory negligence shall, in all
cases whatsoever, be a question of fact and shall, at all times, be left to

the jury."'1
The specific question presented was whether a federal trial judge
might direct a verdict for the defendants on the ground that the plaintiffs were contributorily negligent.' 7 The Supreme Court answered the
question in the affirmative, holding that "the controlling principle governing the decision of the present question is that state laws cannot alter
the essential character or function of a federal court."' s It would seem
that the appealability in federal court of a remittitur filed "under protest" can be no more an issue for application of state rules than was the
power of a federal judge to direct a verdict in Herron. Application of the
Arizona rule in Herron would have "alter[ed] the essential character
. . . of a federal court"; 19 application of state "under protest" procedure in the absence of an analogous federal practice would seem to alter
the very jurisdiction of a federal court of appeals.
Nevertheless, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held in Mooney v.
Henderson Portion Pack Co. 20 that a Tennessee statute2 ' allowing appeals from judgment entered pursuant to "under protest" remittiturs
15. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1970). "State laws as rules of decision. The laws of the
several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of
Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil
actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply."
16. This constitutional provision had been interpreted by the Arizona Supreme
Court to render the jury's verdict conclusive upon the court on the contributory
negligence issue. Inspiration Consol. Copper Co. v. Conwell, 21 Ariz. 480, 486-88, 190
P. 88, 90-91 (1920).
17. 283 U.S. at 92-93.
18, Id. at 94.
19. Id.
20. 334 F.2d 7 (6th Cir. 1964). Mooney was recently reaffirmed in Manning v.
Altec, Inc., 488 F.2d 127, 130-31 (6th Cir. 1973).
21. The Tennessee statute applied in Mooney provides a clear example of the
operation of the "under protest" rule:
Reversal on protested remittitur.-In all jury trials had in civil actions, after the
verdict has been rendered, and on motion for a new trial, when the trial judge
is of the opinion that the verdict in favor of a party should be reduced, and a
remittitur is suggested by him on that account, with the proviso that in case
the party in whose favor the verdict has been rendered refuses to make the
remittitur a new trial will be awarded, the party in whose favor such verdict
has been rendered may make such remittitur under protest, and appeal from the
action of the trial judge to the Court of Appeals; and if, in the opinion of said
Court of Appeals, the verdict of the jury should not have been reduced, but
that the judgment of the trial judge is correct in other respects, the case shall
be reversed to that extent, and judgment shall be rendered in the Court of
Appeals for the full amount originally awarded by the jury in the trial court.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 27-118 (1955).
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must govern the practice of a federal district court sitting in Tennessee,
as well as that of the court of appeals supervising that district. 22 In a
cryptic per curiam opinion, the court simply cited two Supreme Court
cases, Erie Railroad v. Tompkins2 3 and Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 24

for that proposition, but gave no explanation of the way in which those
decisions mandate such a result.
In fact, close examination of Erie leads inescapably to the conclusion that Mooney represents a misapplication of that decision to the
remittitur under protest problem. Erie itself, while far-reaching in its
implications, wrought substantial change in the federal courts only
insofar as it held that state decisional law was included in the phrase
"the laws of the several states" in the Rules of Decision Act.2 5 Even
under the prior position of the Supreme Court,2 6 the phrase "the laws of
27
the several states" was universally assumed to include state statutes.
Thus, it would appear that the decision in Herron was unaffected by
Erie, a conclusion which is supported by a subsequent Supreme Court
28
opinion.
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 2 the other Supreme Court case cited
in Mooney, held that a state's statute of limitations must be applied in
federal equity courts sitting in that state.30 The Court based its decision
upon what it termed the "policy" embodied in Erie: "that for the same
transaction the accident of a suit by a non-resident litigant in a federal
court instead of in a State court a block away should not lead to a
substantially different result."' ,- Hence, the Sixth Circuit's reliance on
Guaranty Trust in deciding Mooney must have been predicated upon a
belief that Guaranty Trust's "outcome determination" test is still the
appropriate means of solving choice of law problems in federal-state law
conflicts, and, further, that the Tennessee "under protest" statute is in
fact "outcome-determinative."
Both of these conclusions seem doubtful in the light of Supreme
Court cases decided after Guaranty Trust. In Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural
22. 334 F.2d at 8-9.

23. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
24. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
25. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1970). See note 15 supra.
26. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842), overruled, Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 77-7& (1934).
27. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Cooperative, Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 539 (1958).
28. Id. at 538-39.

29. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
30. Id. at 101, 110-12.
31. Id. at 109.
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Electric Cooperative, Inc.,3" the Court held that a South Carolina Su-

preme Court decision mandating the determination of a factual issue by
the trial judge would not be binding upon a federal court in a diversity
action, where federal practice dictated the determination of the issue by
the jury.33 The Court noted that, while "outcome determination" analysis as set out in Guaranty Trust might dictate application of the state
rule, "affirmative countervailing considerations" would allow the federal
courts to set their own policy as to certain disputed procedural matters.34
According to the Court in Byrd, one such "countervailing consideration" is the "strong federal policy against allowing state rules to disrupt
the judge-jury relationship in the federal courts,"35 and Herronwas cited
by the Court as authority for this strong federal policy.36 It would thus
seem that under Herron and Byrd, the issue of the appealability of
remittiturs filed "under protest" is one for the federal courts to resolve
on principles of federal law alone, without constraint from state procedures.
This conclusion is also supported by the most recent in the Erie
line of cases, Hanna v. Plumer.17 Hanna presented the question of
whether a state rule as to service of process should be followed by a
federal court in a diversity case, even though that rule conflicted with
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(1). The Court held that the
federal rule should prevail, stating that the "outcome determination" test
set forth in Guaranty Trust was overly strict as applied to procedural
matters, inasmuch as every procedural rule is potentially "outcome
determinative" ex post facto.38 According to Hanna, the proper test of
whether state or federal law should apply in a given case must be framed
with "reference to the twin aims of the Erie rule: discouragement of
forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the
laws."3 9 The impact of nonapplication of the "under protest" rule in
federal courts upon either of these aims would seem to be rather
minimal; it is unlikely, from a practical point of view, that a plaintiff
would choose a state court over a federal court, or vice versa, on the
32. 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
33. Id. at 533-34, 538.
34. Id. at 537.
35. Id. at 538.
36. Id. at 538-39.
37. 380 U.S. 460 (1965). The inconsistency of Mooney with Hanna was noted by
the Seventh Circuit in Dorin v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 382
F.2d 73, 78 (7th Cir. 1967), in which, on highly similar facts, the result reached in
Mooney was specifically rejected.
38. 380 U.S. at 468.

39. Id.
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basis that one but not the other would allow him to appeal directly a
remittitur order erroneously issued by the trial judge.4"
THE "UNDER PROTEST" RULE AND THE SUPREmE COURT
Given that the federal courts are not obligated by Erie and its
progeny to follow state practice as to appeals by remitting parties, the
inquiry shifts to whether federal appellate courts are bound to traditional practice by authoritative decisions of the Supreme Court. Attempted
appeals by remitting parties were involved in two rather old Supreme
Court cases, Koenigsberger v. Richmond Silver Mining Co.41 and
Woodworth v. Chesbrough.42 In Koenigsberger, the plaintiff brought a
contract action in a Dakota territorial court, and received a verdict in his
favor. The trial court overruled the defendant's motion for a new trial on
the grounds of excessiveness of the verdict and newly discovered evidence; the defendant then appealed from the judgment entered on the
verdict to the Supreme Court of the Territory. After the docket of the
Supreme Territorial Court was transferred to the newly formed Supreme
Court of South Dakota, the defendant successfully petitioned for removal of the case to the United States Circuit Court for the District of South
Dakota. The Circuit Court heard the appeal and, being satisfied that the
damages found by the jury were excessive and that the trial judge had
erred in ruling thereon, ordered reversal of the judgment and the grant
of a new trial unless the plaintiff agreed to remit half of his original
judgment. The plaintiff filed the remittitur; both parties excepted to the
circuit court's action and sued out writs of error. The United States
Supreme Court held that the plaintiff, by accepting the circuit court's
remittitur, had "waived all right to object to the order of the court, of
the benefit of which he had availed himself."43
Woodworth v. Chesbrough44 is more directly applicable to Fifth
Circuit practice in that the plaintiff in Woodworth attempted to utilize a
form of the "under protest" rule. Chesbrough had appealed from the
trial court's denial of his motion for a new trial on the ground of
excessive damages. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit agreed
with the defendant's contentions, but affirmed the trial court's judgment
after the plaintiff agreed to file a remittitur. The proffered remittitur
contained a clause stating that plaintiff had agreed to the reduction in
damages
40. Cf. 11 C. WEIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 4, § 2802, at 31 (1973).

41. 158 U.S. 41 (1895).

42. 244 U.S. 79 (1917).
43. 158 U.S. at 52.

44. 244 U.S. 79 (1917).
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for the sole purpose of obtaining the entry of a final judgement herein,

and of securing the affirmance of that part of the judgement which is
not so remitted, and is intended to be without prejudice to plaintiff in
any cross proceeding hereafter prosecuted by him before the Supreme
Court of the United States .... 45
The Court of Appeals approved the remission, stating however that
"such approval is not to be taken to imply that such right of review can
thereafter exist, or that such attempted reservation has any effect to
make the remittitur other than absolute and unconditional. '46 The
Supreme Court dismissed the plaintiffs writ of error on two grounds,
the first echoing the ratio decidendi of Koenigsberger: the filing of the
remittitur constituted a waiver by the plaintiff of his right to litigate the
damage issue further.4 7 The second stated basis for the decision was
procedural in nature. The Court characterized the remittitur as being a
condition precedent to the judgment from which the plaintiff was appealing. Plaintiff's contest of the remittitur order in the appellate court
removed the condition precedent and, consequently, the judgment itself,
returning the proceedings in the lower court to an unappealable status. 4 8
The Court's opinions in Koenigsberger and Woodworth fail to
disclose the exact operation of the putative waiver entailed by a remittitur. The Supreme Court has recently held that the plaintiff, by filing a
remittitur, is not waiving his right to appeal in the sense of compromising his claim against the defendant.49 In fact, the Court acknowledged
that "[a]n order of remittitur is a judicial determination of recoverable
damages; it is not an agreement among the parties involving mutual
concessions.""
Assuming that a plaintiff's acceptance of a remittitur is not a
''waiver" or "compromise" with the defendant, the only party for whose
benefit such a waiver might be enforced against the plaintiff is the court
itself. The propriety of judicial enforcement of such a "waiver" is
questionable. The court is in the position of taking away from the
plaintiff a jury verdict, presenting him with the choice between a new
trial and a reduction in damages, and binding him to his election of one
of these two unpalatable alternatives. Assuming that the trial judge erred
in ordering the remittitur, the plaintiff has no chance to preserve his
valid verdict short of undergoing the uncertainty and expense of a new
45. Id. at 80-81.
46. Id. at 82.

47. Id.
48. Id.

49. Banks v. Chicago Grain Trinmers Ass'n, 390 U.S. 459,466-67 (1968).

50. Id. at 467.
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trial and later, on appeal from the judgment in that trial, having his
original verdict reinstated.
Moreover, the validity of transferring the waiver argument from
Koenigsberger,in which the remitting party apparently filed the remittitur without attempting at the same time to reserve his right to appeal, 5 '
to Woodworth, in which the plaintiff made his reservations quite clear,5 2
is nowhere discussed in Woodworth. At least in those cases in which the
plaintiff has not yet accepted the fruits of his judgment,5 3 and has
signified his protest of the remittitur order, it hardly seems inequitable to
allow him to appeal the court's action in forcing him to the choice of a
new trial or a reduction in damages.5 4
The second argument against the "under protest" rule advanced by
the Supreme Court in Woodworth v. Chesbrough is the procedural one
that judgment entered pursuant to a remittitur constitutes a judgment
entered upon a condition precedent, and that, by withdrawing his
consent to the remittitur, a plaintiff vitiates the very judgment from
which he is attempting to appeal, and so has no ground upon which to
assert appellate jurisdiction.55 Although the internal consistency of this
argument is unassailable, its artificiality renders it susceptible to a rather
simple answer. In the Fifth Circuit cases, that solution lies in the "under
protest" requirement itself. Since the condition precedent is understood
as the plaintiff's acceptance of the remittitur "under protest," i.e., with
reservation of a right to appeal, a subsequent appeal will not breach the
condition, and the judgment will stand.
The fundamental thrust of the Supreme Court's objection to the
"under protest" procedure seems to be based not upon the technical
"waiver" and "condition precedent" analyses undertaken in Woodworth,
but rather upon an approbatory view of the nature and effect of a
remittitur. According to this view, the remittitur order constitutes a
judicial "favor" to the plaintiff to help him avoid a new trial, culminat51. No indication appears from the report that the plaintiff in Koenigsberger
explicitly indicated that his acceptance of the remittitur was "under protest." If his
"protest" was limited to taking exceptions and suing out a writ of error, it would seem
that Koenigsberger's conduct would not allow him to appeal from judgment entered
pursuant to his remittitur, even under current Fifth Circuit practice. See Movible
Offshore Co. v. Ousley, 346 F.2d 870, 875 (5th Cir. 1965).
52. See 244 U.S. at 80-81.
53. Compare Woodworth v. Chesbrough, 244 U.S. 79, 80-81 (1917), with Lewis v.
Wilson, 151 U.S. 551, 555 (1894).
54. Although at first glance the equities of the situation might appear in a different
light to the defendant, it is not at all clear that defendants would, on balance, suffer from
the introduction of the "under protest" rule. See text accompanying notes 75-78 infra.
55. 244 U.S. at 82.
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ing in a judgment for the plaintiff equivalent to the verdict of a "reasonable" jury, from which, under traditional procedure, he may not ap50
peal.
A change in the Court's attitude toward remittiturs can be perceived, however, in decisions subsequent to Koenigsberger and Wood-

worth. This shift in attitude is most clearly revealed in Dimick v.
Schiedt.5 7 Dimick itself decided that additurs would not be allowed in
the federal courts, on the ground that their use would be repugnant to

the seventh amendment.r8 The remittitur practice, not before the Court
in Dimick, was given what Professors Wright and Miller have termed a

"grudging approval," 59 resting, it would seem, chiefly on the ground of
stare decisis:

0

remittiturs have been utilized in the federal courts since

m
1822,1 while additur is a device of more recent origin.

2

Further grounds for distinction between additur and remittitur set

out in Dimick were the existence of some common law precedent for
remittiturs,63 and the fact that, while an order of remittitur is merely the
"lopping off [of] an excrescence" by the court, 4 an additur is a "bald
56. See, e.g., Gunn v. University Comm. to End the War in Viet Nam, 399 U.S.
383, 390 n.5 (1970); Public Serv. Comm'n v. Brashear Freight Lines, Inc., 306 U.S. 204,
206 (1939) (decision based upon statutory appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court from
decrees of three-judge district courts, formerly 28 U.S.C. § 380, presently codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1970)). But see Embry v. Palmer, 107 U.S. 3, 8 (1882)
(victorious plaintiff held allowed to appeal from decree limiting execution on his
judgment). The Supreme Court's enthusiasm for remittiturs at the time of Koenigsberger
is perhaps exemplified by the fact that on at least three occasions roughly contemporaneous with Koenigsberger, the Court itself ordered remittiturs as conditions of affirmance of lower court judgments. Hansen v. Boyd, 161 U.S. 397, 411-12 (1896); Washington & G. R.R. v. Harmon's Adm'r, 147 U.S. 571, 590 (1893); Phillips & Colby Constr.
Co. v. Seymour, 91 U.S. 646, 656 (1875).
57. 293 U.S. 474 (1935).
58. Id. at 486-87.
59. 11 C. Wnson" &A. MiLLER, supra note 4, § 2816, at 107.
60. 293 U.S. at 484-85.
61. The use of remittiturs in the federal courts may be traced back to the decision of
Blunt v. Little, 3 F. Cas. 760 (No. 1578) (C.C.D. Mass. 1822). In Blunt, Justice Story,
sitting in his capacity as Circuit Justice, based his power to order a remittitur sheerly on
the judge's traditional authority to order a new trial on the ground of excessive damages.
Despite the somewhat attenuated character of such reasoning, Blunt was cited with great
frequency as authority for the remittitur power throughout the nineteenth century, with
very little attendant discussion of the underlying rationale for the remittitur power, or of
any way by which the remittitur might be reconciled with the seventh amendment's
mandate that no jury finding "shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United
States, than according to the rules of the common law." See, e.g., Arkansas Valley Land
& Cattle Co. v. Mann, 130 U.S. 69, 73 (1889); Northern Pac. RR. v. Herbert, 116 U.S.
642, 646-47 (1886).
62. 293 U.S. at 484-85.
63. Id. at 487-88.
64. ld. at 486.
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addition of something which in no sense can be said to be included in
the verdict."6 5 As to the first of these distinctions, however, the Court
stated in Dimick itself that the common law precedent for remittiturs
consists merely of "the practice of some of the English judges-a
practice which has been condemned as opposed to the principles of the
common law by every reasoned English decision, both before and after
the adoption of the Federal Constitution, which we have been able to
find."66 Presumably, therefore, the Court itself was not convinced of the
validity of this distinction. The second ground, that a remittitur merely
reduces damages to a "lesser included amount" of the jury's finding, 67 is
also open to dispute. The jury, in reaching its verdict for a certain sum,
has presumably rejected all other amounts in arriving at that verdict;
therefore, choosing a rejected amount that is higher than the actual
verdict would seem no greater an intrusion into the jury's domain than
selecting a rejected amount lower than that verdict. 68 The distinction
between remittitur and additur may thus fairly be said to lie chiefly in
the inertial, stare decisis effects of the long history of the remittitur in
federal courts. This conclusion finds support in the Court's statement in
Dimick that "[iln the light reflected by the foregoing review of the
English decisions and commentators, it, therefore, may be that if the
question of remittitur were now before us for the first time, it would
be decided otherwise." 69
More recently, the Court has accepted the proposition that "[an
order of remittitur is a judicial determination of recoverable damages
. . . ."7 Since this determination reduces the award granted to plaintiff
by the jury, it can logically be regarded as sufficiently adverse to sustain
an appeal. Such is the view espoused by the Fifth Circuit. 71 If this view
65. Id.
66. Id. at 484.
67. Id. at 486.
68. Carlin, Remittiturs and Additurs, 49 W. VA. L.Q. 1, 18 (1942). But see James,
Remedies for Excessiveness or Inadequacy of Verdicts: New Trial on Some or All Issues,
Remittitur and Additur, 1 DuQuEsNE L. REv. 143, 154-55 (1963).
69. 293 U.S. at 484.
70. Banks v. Chicago Grain Trimmers Ass'n, 390 U.S. 459,467 (1968).
71. In Delta Eng'r Co. v. Scott, 322 F.2d 11 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 905 (1964), the first Fifth Circuit case to apply the "under protest" rule, the
court stated that "[ilt would be a strange rule that would keep a plaintiff from
challenging the legal correctness of any action having such portentous consequences."
322 F.2d at 15. In a later "under protest" decision, the Fifth Circuit reaffirmed the view
expressed in Delta Engineering, holding that the plaintiff, who was refused an appeal
from the remittitur order itself on the ground that the order was merely interlocutory,
had suffered a "sufficiently adverse adjudication" to be allowed to appeal from the
judgment entered pursuant to her protested remittitur. Steinberg v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of
North America, 364 F.2d 266, 268 (5th Cir. 1966).

1160

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1975:1150

is correct, as Dimick indicates, 72 the apparent foundation of the Court's
decision in Woodworth has crumbled.
The "under protest" rule may, in fact, present itself as a procedure
by which the judge's virtually untrammeled discretion in controlling jury
verdicts, disapproved in Dimick, can be limited. The practice of allowing a remitting party to obtain immediate review of the action of the trial
judge in forcing him to surrender a part of his jury verdict is, on
balance, supportive of the jury autonomy sought to be preserved by the
seventh amendment. The Fifth Circuit's version of the "under protest"
rule allows the appellate court two options in reviewing the trial judge's
remittitur order: the court may affirm, finding the remittitur to have
been proper; alternatively, the court may find error in the order, and
direct that judgment be entered on the original verdict.73 The operational effect of the rule is thus simply to render immediately reviewable by
an appellate court the trial judge's capacity to deprive plaintiffs of their
jury verdicts, and thereby to diminish the possible exercise of judicial
supervision of juries. In short, the tension identified by the Court in
Dimick, the threat to jury autonomy posed by the remittitur practice on
the one hand and the disruption of settled case law that would be
entailed in holding remittiturs unconstitutional on the other, has created
an ambivalence in the Court's thinking on the remittitur issue. Against
this background, the "under protest" rule should commend itself as a
means of curbing the ability of trial judges to "reexamine" jury verdicts
while doing little violence to established case law.
The precedential value of Koenigsberger and Woodworth in cases
involving remittiturs ordered by trial judges is further diminished by the
fact that both cases involved remittiturs ordered by appellate tribunals. 74
With the sensitivity to the seventh amendment ramifications of remittiturs voiced in Dimick, the groundwork has been laid for the limitation
of Koenigsberger and Woodworth to their own facts, i.e., appellate
remittiturs, and the adoption of the "under protest" rule in cases involv72. See 293 U.S. at 484-85 and text accompanying notes 57-69 supra.
73. Wiggs v. Courshon, 485 F.2d 1281, 1283 (5th Cir. 1973). The Second Circuit in
Reinertsen v. George W. Rogers Constr. Corp., No. 564 (2d Cir., July 3, 1975), see note
10 supra, postulated a third possibility-the ordering of a reduced remittitur by the
appellate court. As the court points out, in such an instance "plaintiffs consent to the
larger remittitur should certainly cover the smaller." Id. at 4652. Moreover, such a
situation assumes not only the presence of an irrational jury but an abuse of discretion
by the trial judge. The likelihood of these two factors occurring in the same trial cannot
be great.
74. This distinction was pointed out with respect to Woodworth in Thomas v. E. J.
Korvette, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 1163, 1171 (E.D. Pa. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 476
F.2d 471 (3d Cir. 1973).
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ing trial court remittiturs. The courts of appeals would thus seem to be
free, as the Fifth Circuit has apparently deemed itself to be, to formulate
their own policies as to application or nonapplication of the "under
protest" rule.
THE EFFECTS OF THE "UNDER PROTEST" RULE
ON JUDICIAL ECONOMY

Since the courts of appeals are unconstrained by either state practice or direct federal precedent in their choice as to application of the
"under protest" rule, some notice may justifiably be taken of the effect
of the introduction of that procedure upon the workloads of the district
and appellate courts. Although it is beyond the scope of this Note to
undertake any detailed analysis of the problem, some preliminary observations may be offered.
The optimal scenario for the "under protest" rule would be one in
which a jury correctly delivers a verdict for plaintiff, and the trial judge,
believing the verdict to be excessive, abuses his discretion by ordering a
prohibitive remittitur as a condition to his refusing a defendant's motion
for a new trial. The plaintiff confronted with this situation has but two
options under the traditional view, no matter how flagrant he may
believe the trial judge's abuse of discretion to have been. Those options
are to accept judgment for a mere fraction of his original verdict, or to
submit to a new trial, with the possibility that he will receive a lower
damage award in that second trial, and the certainty that he will be put
through a great deal more trouble and expense. Assuming sufficient
resources on the plaintiff's part, or sufficient faith in the eventual
outcome of the litigation, the plaintiff will opt for the new trial. The new
trial will, of course, necessitate the empaneling of a new jury and the
expenditure of considerable judicial time in the district court.
Under the Fifth Circuit's rule, the plaintiff confronted with an
unreasonable remittitur order may simply file the remittitur "under
protest" and appeal, hoping for a reversal in the court of appeals.
Should the appellate tribunal reverse, the litigation will be at an end,
and the plaintiff will have been returned to the status quo ante the
remittitur order. Should the court of appeals affirm, the litigation will be
at an end nonetheless, plaintiff having had an appellate hearing on the
alleged error of the trial judge. The "under protest" rule will, under this
scenario, have saved considerable time and expense for the litigants and
for the district court, arguably at the expense of some time in the
appellate court.
Any problems with the "under protest" rule lie, therefore, chiefly
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in the effect of shifting an additional caseload to the courts of appeals.
This additional caseload would consist chiefly of unmeritorious appeals,
since many unreasonable remittitur orders would come before the appellate courts for review at the conclusion of the second trial even
under the traditional rule. Although there have been indications that
the appellate courts are considerably more overburdened than are the
federal district courts, 5 the shift in caseload to the appellate courts may
cause fewer problems than one might suppose. An appellate court, unlike a trial court called upon for a trial de novo, may dispose of an unmeritorious appeal by a per curiam opinion or no opinion at all, with
relatively little expenditure of judicial time. 76 Thus, the net effect of
the additional caseload might well be quite negligible.
Moreover, although once again conclusive data is lacking, the
frequency with which remittitur orders will require ful-dress appellate
consideration should be limited by the relative simplicity of the issues
involved, and the rather heavy burden which must be carried by the
remitting plaintiff on appeal. As applied in the Fifth Circuit, the "under
protest" rule requires that the appellant show that the trial judge abused
his discretion in ordering the remittitur by requiring remission "of a sum
which would reduce the verdict below the maximum award which is
reasonably supported by the evidence." 77 The relatively clear-cut nature
of this standard should reduce considerably the burden of the appellate
court in dealing with appeals from judgments rendered pursuant to
"protested" remittiturs.
Further consideration of the effect of adoption of the "under
protest" rule from the standpoint of judicial economy must await statistical study. 78 The brief overview of the problem presented here would
seem to indicate, however, that the increased burden on appellate courts
might well be more than balanced by the benefit to litigants in obtaining
speedy review of remittitur orders, and to the district courts in avoiding
a number of new trials.
75. See generally Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The
Threat to the Function of Review and the National Law, 82 HIv.L. REv. 542 (1969);
Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System, The Geographical
Boundaries of the Several Judicial Circuits: Recommendations for Change, 62 F.R.D.
223 (1973); Proceedings of the A.B.A. 93rd Annual Meeting, Improving Procedures in
the DecisionalProcess, 52 F.R.D. 51 (1970). It is interesting to note that the secondmentioned source lists the Fifth Circuit as the most overburdened circuit of all. 62
F.R.D. at 230.
76. Carrington, supra note 75, at 559.
77. Bonura v. Sea Land Serv., Inc., 505 F.2d 665, 669 (5th Cir. 1974).
78. A call for such study was issued by the Second Circuit in Reinertsen v. George
W. Rogers Constr. Corp., No. 564, at 4654 (2d Cir., July 3, 1975).
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CONCLUSION

This Note has offered an analysis of the considerations underlying
the appealability of judgments entered pursuant to remittiturs in the
federal courts. The conclusion to be drawn from the cases would seem
to be that the federal courts of appeals are free, from the standpoint of
both state practice and United States Supreme Court precedents, to
shape their own procedures as to appeals by remitting parties. The
decision as to whether other federal circuits should follow the Fifth
Circuit in applying an "under protest" rule becomes, therefore, a relatively unfettered policy choice, governed at least in part by the goals of
maximizing judicial economy and balancing the rights of plaintiffs and
defendants in civil actions.
Although organized statistical study must precede any final decision on the effects of the "under protest" rule on judicial economy, there
would seem to be little reason to fear that introduction of the "under
protest" rule would cause an intolerable increase in appellate caseload.
Any increase that did occur would, in all likelihood, be balanced by the
reduction in the number of new trials in the district courts. In instances
involving flagrant abuses of discretion by trial judges in ordering remittiturs, the "under protest" rule would unquestionably save time and
expense for both plaintiffs and defendants; the savings to defendants in
these cases might, however, be offset by some increase in the number of
frivolous appeals that might result from abandonment of the traditional
rule. Such conclusions are, however, quite speculative in the absence of
statistical data.
What seems certain is that the seventh amendment ramifications of
the remittitur process render the "under protest" rule a desirable one,
introducing as it does a means by which trial judges' "reexaminations'"
of jury verdicts may be readily reviewed. In the absence of any data
indicating a pronounced detrimental effect of the rule on appellate
caseload, the "under protest" rule would seem on balance to be a
salutary one for the federal courts to adopt.

